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Abstract 
 
This paper attempts to quantify how the rapid increase in shale gas production in 
the past fifteen years has impacted regional natural gas spot prices. This method 
of natural gas extraction-pumping water mixed with sand and clay first vertically 
and then horizontally, with clay and sand particulates holding fractures open to 
allow the flow of natural gas-has a shorter well lifespan and faster decline rate 
than conventional wells. Through analyzing the degree of market integration 
between shale gas production and spot prices, we can quantify what impact 
different shale plays have had on the regional pricing of natural gas. With this 
information, we can then discuss how the exploitation of the Marcellus Shale, a 
relatively untapped shale play in the Northeast, could impact different natural gas 
price regions. 
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Chapter I. Introduction 
 
1.1 Natural Gas and America’s Energy Future 
 
As the human population grows exponentially, energy demand grows along with it in an 
even greater exponential fashion. The great industrial revolutions and technological advances 
have snowballed into a growing addiction to a consistent and abundant supply of energy to 
power our innovations. Through a combination of the convenience of fossil fuel power and a 
daunting understanding of the global threats that these resources hold, management of the 
American energy supply has been an emotional debate in recent years and two distinct 
perspectives have arisen.  
One perspective is offered in Al Gore’s documentary The Inconceivable Truth, which 
brought global warming to the national spotlight. Leaders of the ‘smart grid,’ an innovative 
electrical grid that would allow for greater diversity in energy sources and would change the way 
in which power is transmitted, also pride themselves within this perspective. They argue that as 
the earth continues to rise in temperature, to levels as high as our society has ever known, we 
must find ways to use energy efficiently, altering our fuel structure to harness power from 
renewable sources that can produce clean and consistent fuel, which will guarantee America a 
secure resource base and a healthy planet. 
Another perspective is voiced by leaders of petroleum companies and the many large 
businesses that thrive on the accessibility of the current electrical grid. This group argues that our 
current grid, supporting cheap and abundant fuel, has rarely failed our energy needs and large 
capital investments into new energy infrastructure will sacrifice technological progress. These 
two perspectives must come together and understand an adequate solution to both ensure our 
stable energy structure while promoting continued economic growth. The two groups will likely 
find a middle ground through the use of a flexible supply of both renewable and non-renewable 
fuel generation.   
Natural Gas is one of the many fossil fuels we use today, and it has been rising since 
1996 as a fuel source for electricity generation (Figure 1-1). This rise has driven coal use down 
to its lowest share of electricity generation since 1995. Coal and natural gas essentially compete 
for the same consumer base: utilities that generate electricity, industry that can use either fuel for 
heat, and homeowners and commercial businesses that buy electricity packages from local 
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suppliers based on prices. As natural gas use has gone up at the expense of coal, the price of 
natural gas has recently gone down relative to coal. This counterintuitive drop in the price of 
natural gas is due to the increasingly large supply of natural gas due to the rise in unconventional 
gas production.  
 
Figure 1-1. Electricity Generation; Coal vs. Natural Gas (Energy Information Administration, 
2013) 
 
1.2 Unconventional Gas 
 
The rise in supply of natural gas comes from so-called “unconventional gas,” 
predominantly found in the form of shale gas using a relatively new technology known as 
hydraulic fracturing, which utilizes horizontal well drilling to extract the natural gas embedded 
within layers of shale rock. For years geologists have known of gas reserves in tight, deep shale 
rock layers, but have deemed it too deep to get to and not economically viable to extract. The 
recent sentiment is that the new technology can not only extract the gas, but at a capital cost that 
it makes economic sense for producers to extract the reserves.  
Shale gas plays have been notable in many different regions of the United States, most 
notably the Barnett Shale in North-central Texas, the Fayetteville Shale in Arkansas, the 
Haynesville Shale in East Texas and West Louisiana, the Woodford Shale in Oklahoma, the 
Eagle Ford Shale in South Texas, and the Bakken Shale in East Montana and West North Dakota 
(Figure 1-2).  
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Figure 1-2. Notable Shale Plays in the United States (Energy Information Administration, 2013c) 
 
With unconventional natural gas plays becoming a larger part of the picture, the 
Marcellus Shale, the most recent shale gas play, lying in South-central New York and hitting 
chunks of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia, has come into the bright lights of the local 
Northeast governments, as they debate whether or not the environmental risk of shale gas 
extraction is worth the reward. Environmental advocates urge that fracking creates a flow of 
wastewater that alters natural landscapes, decreases mined property values, produces a great 
degree of pollution, and increases exposure to dangerous chemicals. 
Despite some exploitation and production, the Marcellus shale has been largely 
untouched, as a recent survey “estimated a mean undiscovered natural gas resource of 84,198 
Billion Cubic Feet (BCF) of undiscovered, technically recovered natural gas,” (USGS 2011a). 
This is 82,000 BCF larger than the previous assessment in 2002, claiming the area only 
contained roughly 2 BCF of undiscovered natural gas (USGS 2011b). To put this number in 
perspective, the United States used 24,285 BCF of natural gas in the year of 2011. 
Hypothetically all the technically recoverable, undiscovered amount of natural gas in the 
Marcellus Shale could fuel over three years of the demand of natural gas in 2011, assuming the 
estimate to be accurate. This of course is impossible, but nonetheless points to the unutilized, 
large supply of natural gas embedded within the Marcellus formation. This has undoubtedly 
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sparked the interest of investors and gas exploration companies, but this curiosity has been met 
with formidable opposition from environmental cohorts. 
The exploitation of the Marcellus Shale has been hotly contested. The recent deregulation 
of the Natural Gas industry has given open access to any producer to exploit a gas resource. 
Exploration companies have used this freedom to lease out lands rich in Marcellus shale gas, 
only to be thwarted by local governments claiming they cannot drill due to incomplete studies 
into whether potential environmental hazards of shale gas fracturing can be mitigated. 
‘Hydrofracking,’ or fracking for short, has raised concerns in regards to pollution and local 
environments. These environmental dangers are legitimate, but if producers can mitigate the 
damage done to the environment and human health then there will be noted positives from the 
standpoint of both consumer and producer surplus.  
A natural gas pipeline map shows that without a local supply the Northeast is dependent 
on the Midwest and the Gulf of Mexico for natural gas (Figure 1-3). The exploitation of 
reservoirs in the Appalachian Basin can give the northeast independence with a local supply to 
help prices here become more stable. However, this may not be enough to qualm the strong 
contingent of environmentalists and regulation in this region. Analyzing how the Marcellus and 
other, greater developed shale plays have moved from wellhead production to regional spot price 
will lend insight into how the exploitation of the Marcellus Shale could move through regional 
gas markets. This knowledge could help give useful answers in a hotly contested debate. 
 
Figure 1-3. Natural Gas Pipeline Infrastructure in America and Canada (Energy Information 
Administration 2013d) 
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1.2 Plan of the Research 
 
The next four chapters will go as follows. Chapter 2 analyzes the previous literature on the 
history of regulation and subsequent deregulation of the natural gas market, the determination of 
the price of natural gas, the unconventional natural gas industry, and the environmental costs of 
extracting natural gas from tight shale beds. Chapter 3 outlines the data series used, the methods 
of determining causality between regional natural gas shale production and prices, and offers 
hypotheses regarding the analysis. Chapter 4 presents the results of the cointegration analysis and 
discusses inferences drawn from different levels of significance found within the analysis. 
Lastly, chapter 5 ends the study with a conclusion and suggestions for further research.    
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Chapter II. Literature Review 
 
II. 1. A Brief History and Overview of the Natural Gas Industry 
 
 The natural gas industry has a long history of regulation within the market, mainly to 
benefit the consumers. Beginning in the 1930s during the Great Depression and President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal included the establishment of the Federal Power Commission 
(FPC) as a regulatory agency, with the power to control electric power and natural gas 
companies to the benefit of the public interest. The Federal Power Act of 1935 gave the agency 
the job of assuring an abundant energy supply with the goal of securing ‘just and reasonable’ 
prices for buyers of natural gas to be handed down to residential and commercial markets. Thus, 
natural gas was regulated at both the pipeline, and city-gates. (MacAvoy 2000) 
At the pipeline, regulations were set based on tariffs that ensured sufficient profits 
covered capital and operational costs, interest and depreciation rates. A 1954 Supreme Court 
case, Phillips Petroleum Company vs. Wisconsin, extended the jurisdiction of the FPC to control 
prices at the wellhead (Doane and Spulber 1994, p.480). These regulations consisted of price 
ceilings to ensure prices were no greater than the costs of exploration and production. The FPC 
created an intricate process of creating a price contract that gave the well a specific price ceiling 
based on the expected supply in that well. Many natural gas companies argued the ceilings given 
to them, resulting in backlogging and suspensions for natural gas sellers. These problems 
continued through the 1970s, and gas shortages sprang up everywhere. Breyer and MacAvoy 
explain the phenomenon. 
In sum, as a result of regulation in the 1960s, buyers for interstate consumption 
obtained fewer reserves than they wished. For the most part, those buyers were 
pipelines ultimately serving primarily residential customers. The short reserve 
supplies were bid away from these buyers by interstate gas users…regulation led 
to a virtually inevitable gas shortage. It brought about a variety of economically 
wasteful results, and it ended up hurting those whom it was designed to benefit 
(Breyer and MacAvoy 1973, pp. 979, 987). 
 
These residential buyers, whom regulation was primarily aimed at helping, inevitably lost 
because their sellers could not outbid other gas users for the shortage brought on by the price 
controls. A graph is constructed to show how regulatory price ceilings can accrue producer and 
consumer losses (Figure 2-1). It is estimated that through the FPC price controls, buyers and 
producers both lost more than a combined $20 billion from 1968-1977 (MacAvoy 2000).  
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Figure 2-1. Price Regulations and Consumer loss as a result of 1954 Supreme Court Case 
Phillips Petroleum Company vs. Wisconsin. Pmarket = Market price of gas; Pfpc = Price with FPC 
regulations; Qmarket = Market quantity of gas supplied; Qfpc = Quantity of Gas supplied under 
FPC regulations. Triangle ABF represents Consumer Loss; Triangle BEF represents Deadweight 
loss. Rectangle CBDE represents Producer Loss. 
 
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 attempted to move in the opposite regulatory way, 
hoping to restore supply-and-demand markets by creating price floors. The NGPA regulatory 
scheme worked to create gradual deregulation with three different categories of gas. The first 
category classified a tiny portion of gas as ‘High-cost gas,’ which narrowly defined the amount 
of gas that was completely deregulated. The second category consisted of a lot more gas and was 
subjected to a price floor of $2.42/MMBtu in 1980. Lastly, “old gas,” had various different price 
floors averaging out to $1.75/MMBtu. New gas and most intrastate gas were scheduled for 
deregulation between 1985 and 1988 (Pierce Jr., 1982, pp. 89-90). Overall, this half-deregulation 
technique created different inefficiencies and the market was not yet fully deregulated when the 
FPC was finally dismantled in the mid-1980s 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) replaced the FPC to rejuvenate the 
industry and restore simple buying and selling relationships that producers and buyers had lost 
for about 50 years. In 1985, the commission ordered open access for pipelines to become active 
transporters for gas bought directly from producers, and were able to set their own rates to 
compete in their given market. Open access finally took full effect in 1992, with FERC Order 
636. 
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The Commission’s primary aim in adopting [Order No.636] is to improve the 
competitive structure of the natural gas industry and at the same time maintain an 
adequate and reliable service. The Commission will do this by regulating 
pipelines as merchants and as open access transporters…The first goal is to ensure 
that all shippers have meaningful access to the pipeline transportation grid so that 
willing buyers and sellers can meet in a competitive, national market to transact 
the most efficient deals possible. As the House Committee Report to the 
Decontrol Act stated, ‘All sellers must be able to reasonably reach the highest-
bidding buyer in an increasingly national market. All buyers must be free to reach 
the lowest-selling producer, and obtain shipment of its gas to them on even terms 
with other supplies (FERC, 1992, p.7) 
 
The reform stands today, as the act implied a network of integrated natural gas spot markets in 
which any seller or buyer can enter the market, hence the ‘open access.’ These reforms have now 
given natural gas the ability to adjust freely to market conditions, allowing movement from 
producers to consumers in a relatively hands-off approach. Residential customers now have 
greater choice and service options. This approach has given the price of natural gas the ability to 
drift to a set market price. However, this newfound market-driven industry brought price 
volatility. With little regulation, natural gas prices have been more susceptible to shocks than it 
was during regulation. This is shown through the national average natural gas wellhead price, 
which starts to experience these sorts of mini-shocks in late 1987, about a year and a half after 
open access and deregulation was ordered upon gas pipelines (Figure 2-2).  
 
Figure 2-2. Natural Gas Wellhead price from Jan-1976 to Nov-2012. (Energy Information 
Administration, 2013a) 
 
 Meanwhile, deregulation within the gas industry decreased volatility in domestic 
production, as production rises and falls consistently during the 1980s (Figure 2-3). After 
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complete deregulation in the early 1990s, these peaks and valleys flatten and production is more 
consistent, mainly due to open access laws promoting competition between many exploration 
companies.  
 
Figure 2-3. Natural gas domestic production from Jan-1973 to Oct-2012 (Energy Administration, 
2013b) 
   
In 2011, natural gas consumption flows consisted of 24.37 TCF shipped for consumption, 
while 22.38 TCF was produced by natural gas wells. Consumption mainly went to industrial 
companies, electric power utilities, residential districts, and commercial establishments, while 
exports accounted for 1.51 TCF. Withdrawals and additions to storage nearly cancelled each 
other out.  
 
Figure 2-4. Natural Gas Production Flows in Trillion Cubic Feet (TCF). (Energy Information 
Administration 2011) 
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 The natural gas industry now has three parties on the supply side and four parties on the 
demand side. The supply side consists of producers, pipeline operators, and local distribution 
companies (LDCs), and the demand side includes residential, commercial, industrial, and 
electrical demand. First, natural gas wellheads are bought and leased by producers, where the gas 
they pump is sent to the pipelines. The gas is then purchased at the city-gate by pipeline 
operators or independent traders, where they sell it to three parties: electrical utilities, industrial 
companies, and local distribution companies (LDCs). The LDCs buy the gas using long-term 
contracts with the pipelines and redistribute their gas to residential and commercial markets 
using a distribution charge, coming with a high markup from the city-gate price (Mohammadi 
2011). While residential and commercial markets must go through LDCs, electrical and 
industrial companies can buy straight from the pipeline and do not have to go through the 
markup that residential and commercial customers are susceptible to. Industrial and electrical 
companies can typically change fuels depending on prices, while residential and commercial 
markets are typically tied to a single fuel, as switching between fuels is time-consuming and 
requires collaboration with another LDC, and most locations only have one in their area. With 
regulation firmly out the window, natural gas market players now act on prices set by market 
demand and the supply of natural gas.  
 
II. 2. Economic Analyses of Natural Gas Pricing: Determining the Price of Natural Gas 
 The demand for natural gas comes at the previously mentioned four levels-industrial, 
electrical, commercial, and residential demands. Many studies analyze residential and 
commercial demand together, because both segments respond to weather changes in similar 
ways, with greater use in the winter months and less use in the summer months depending on 
heating demands. There is also a fuel substitution effect, as there has been an observed historical 
correlation between natural gas and oil prices. This would make sense, as both fuels can be used 
for the same function and could match each other’s price movements.  
The historical trend between oil and natural gas prices has been called either the 10-to-1 
rule or the 6-to-1 rule (Brown and Yucel 2008). The 10-to-1 rule is where the Henry Hub natural 
gas price per million BTU is equal to one-tenth the price per barrel of WTI (West Texas 
Intermediate) Crude Oil. The 6-to-1 rule holds the same concept, just as one-sixth the price 
instead of one-tenth. The historical trend is relatively accurate; however after 2000 the 
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relationship falls out because the natural gas price series begins to get too volatile, most likely 
due to the formation of a spot market for natural gas. Tests on whether oil and natural gas prices 
decoupled during the period 1997-2009 have found “temporary shifts” but that the prices return 
to a relationship after the volatility in natural gas prices is statistically accounted for. When 
taking into account “crude oil, weather, seasonality, storage, and production disruptions explain 
natural gas prices quite well,” (Brown and Yucel 2008) and when controlling for volatility, these 
factors can help to determine the price of natural gas. 
There is an obvious price elasticity effect, as many different studies have been used to ask 
whether the demand for natural gas is elastic or inelastic. The long-run demand for natural gas 
has been shown relatively elastic. Different studies show a large variation of -0.17 to -2.42, with 
a mean long-run elasticity at -1.11 (Bohi 1981). Regional demand elasticities have also been 
analyzed, with specific price elasticity effects analyzed in the Northeastern parts of USA 
(Beierlein et al. 1981), which conclude to find natural gas demand inelastic in the short run and 
elastic in the long run. Meanwhile, another study uses a two-stage least squares model to test for 
price elasticities through regions in the United States and concludes that price elasticity for 
demand of natural gas varies heavily from region to region. 
Natural Gas demand by sector by region is found to be highly elastic; seven of the 
30 equations showed own-price elasticities greater than -2.0. This finding 
coincides with what Beierlein et. al have concluded about the size of own-price 
elasticities of electricity and natural gas in Northeastern USA, i.e. demand is price 
elastic in the long run and inelastic in the short run (Liu 1983) 
 
This study is significant because it shows how the spot market has created regional differences 
across the USA. Conclusions have also been made regarding how residential and commercial 
sectors are more price sensitive than the industrial sector, as the industrial sectors have flexibility 
to buy directly from different pipeline operators with little markup while residential consumers 
typically go to one LDC and pay a large markup. When analyzing price elasticity and natural gas 
demand on a state level with the use of an Autoregressive Lag Model, one study found 
residential natural gas prices, electricity prices and heating degree days as significant while 
disposable income, fuel oil prices, and industrial gas prices are insignificant, and estimate 
relatively inelastic price (Payen and Loomis, 2011). Further research needs to be done on 
different regions to analyze whether or not price elasticities vary from region to region in the 
spot market. The regional market has caused regional variations within the natural gas demand, 
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and the Northeast market has proven to be elastic in the long-run. Meanwhile, one study found 
residential and commercial prices to respond in a more extreme fashion to an increase in the 
wellhead price than industrial or electrical demand would, due to the fashion of the markups and 
the development of the spot market (Mohammadi 2011). 
The majority of the natural gas is produced offshore in the Gulf of Mexico, Texas, 
Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Western Canada, and the Rocky Mountains. The northeast 
states account for 2.4% of the share of natural gas production. Market centers provide services to 
ease gas trading and transportation costs, while pipeline expansion has increased the integration 
of the national network, all giving gas producers and sellers more choices. By analyzing spot 
markets with an autoregressive regression model from 1993-1997, the early years under 
deregulation, studies find the East and Central regions form a highly integrated market, but that 
this market is quite segmented from the morel loosely integrated Western market (Cuddington 
and Wang 2006). Another analysis of spot market integration concluded that deregulation has 
integrated separate, even distant gas markets into one market (DeVany and Walls 1993). By 
now, it seems as though the Law of One Price (LOOP) for the natural gas market is in full effect, 
with little to no barrier of integration.  
Studies have been performed to analyze competition and the elasticity of substitution 
between coal, natural gas, and petroleum for electricity generation and industrial use. One report 
took nine studies done previously on American industrial fuel substitution to analyze average 
substitution elasticities. They found these elasticities to be low except for the coal-natural gas 
substitution which was -0.7185 (Stern 2009). One study uses a locally flexible translog form to 
investigate interfuel substitution, to which they find all elasticities relatively low, suggesting 
interfuel substitution as limited in the near term (Serletis et al. 2010). Lastly, the EIA conducted 
their own study of fuel substitution within power generation, and found elasticities to be 
relatively low with the exception of substitution between petroleum and natural gas (Energy 
Information Administration, 2012). Historically, this kind of substitution effect between oil and 
natural gas is expected, as it is easier to convert a natural gas plant to and from an oil plant than 
to convert a natural gas plant to and from a coal plant.  
 In conclusion, many studies attempt to quantify residential and commercial demand into 
determinants of different factors, the most important being income and price effects, weather and 
seasonality, storage conditions, and fuel substitution effects (mainly oil). There have been many 
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different studies analyzing regional demand for natural gas, as analysts hold views that aggregate 
demand studies cannot test for regional variations in market conditions, especially with the 
recently deregulated natural gas market where regional variations are quite high. The few 
analyses of the spot market have shown the entire market as almost fully integrated, with the 
West as slightly separated from the Central and Eastern parts of America.  
 
II. 3. The Unconventional Natural Gas Industry  
 Unconventional natural gas resources are abundant in North America. According to an 
assessment of the technically recoverable unconventional resources in North America, mainly 
USA and Canada, there are 274 TCF (Trillion Cubic Feet) of recoverable natural gas from shale 
reservoirs in North America (Pickering and Smead 2008). The number is large, showing that the 
resource is clearly there, yet the economic nature of unconventional natural gas plays makes it 
difficult for investment and adequate rates of return, problems that are necessary to address as we 
continue to exploit these reserves in the coming decades. 
 According to the EIA, there are six types of unconventional natural gas plays, with some 
being recently discovered. Deep natural gas is natural gas found deeper than conventional 
drilling depths, requiring greater force and pressure in order to extract the natural gas. Tight 
natural gas is gas stuck in a very tight geologic formation, more so than the average conventional 
well. Tight natural gas is similar to shale gas in that both trap natural gas in rock that is highly 
impermeable. Coalbed Methane (CBM) is natural gas trapped in coalbeds, in the fractures and on 
the surface of coal. Known as a hazard to coal miners, capturing the natural gas within coal was 
originally done to keep coal miners safe, but now commercial production has taken-off to the 
point where it accounts for 10% of total natural gas production. Geopressurized Zones are 
another unconventional natural gas resource, as natural gas is formed through underground 
formations with high pressure rates. Natural gas is formed through the compression of clay 
compress on top of porous material deep underground. Lastly, methane hydrates form natural gas 
through pseudo-ice solids that form a mixture of natural gas and water. The exploration of this 
type of natural gas reserve is still in the research phase, with reserves thought to be significant 
but extraction processes quite unknown.  
Unconventional gas plays are generally characterized by low geologic risk and higher 
commercial risk. The low geologic risk is due to the smaller chance of a ‘dry hole,’ which is an 
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unsuccessful well that produces no gas resources, than conventional wells. Shale gas wells 
deplete much faster than conventional wells, as they exhibit an early peak followed by steady 
decline. Shale wells experience a life of 8-12 years, while conventional wells have a life of 30-40 
years (Stevens 2010).  
The commercial risk is high because the wells typically require large capital costs, larger 
than conventional wells, and investors typically need to wait some years after production to get 
to a break-even stage and start to see profits. One study attempts to project production, capital 
costs, and subsequent cash flow in a time series of shale gas plays, and concludes that there is a 
wait of almost nine years until the average well breaks even and cash flow turns positive. The 
average shale well in the study experienced a steep increase from year 2 through year 4, where it 
hits the peak and then declines all the way through the rest of the life of the well. Lastly, the 
analysis concludes an estimated 85% chance that shale gas plays would break even, portraying a 
considerable amount of risk (Gray et al. 2007). With high capital costs and commercial 
uncertainty from well to well, the total investment risk is decently large. The commercial risk 
associated with these shale plays may be forcing natural gas operators into a bind. 
…natural gas production from unconventional sources has become largely sub-
economic over the past three years for a large portion of the US natural gas 
operators. A majority of gas operators continues to outspend their net earnings on 
CAPEX (Capital Expenditure) programs. They must do so, because of the short-
life cycle of unconventional gas wells. If they were to stop CAPEX (Capital 
Expenditure) for new wells, free cash flow would dry up quickly. Low well 
productivity data, together with high cost of recovery (well completion cost and 
frac-jobs), low gas prices and drying up of access to new capital are the 
underlying causes for lagging cash flow from unconventional wells (Weijermars 
2011). 
 
The analysis here notes that if there is a drop in projected net earnings, the burden will fall on 
natural gas operators to cover this drop. With recent low prices, shale gas operators are having a 
tough time finding investors, and analysts have gone as far to question whether a price-floor 
policy is necessary to bail out the unconventional natural gas industry (Weijermars 2011).  
These problems with the natural gas industry and unconventional commercial risk have 
garnered recent pessimism with the projected rising shale gas industry. One analysis portrayed 
the industry as “after the gold rush” (Berman 2012). Berman notes the large declining rates of 
the biggest shale reserves, with the average Haynesville Shale well declining at 48%. 
Meanwhile, standard conventional wells have declining rates of up to 20%. For the shale gas 
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industry to meet projected growth expectations in the coming decades, the industry needs higher 
gas prices. When comparing shale and conventional wells, there are clear differences in lifespan, 
profiles, and declining rates. There are also geologic differences, mainly in terms of Estimated 
Ultimate Recovery (EUR), where it is by and large well known that shale wells offers higher 
EURs than conventional wells (Bahily 2011).  
 
II. 4. Environmental Costs of Shale Gas Extraction 
   
 Despite the large amount of natural gas estimated in shale gas reservoirs, horizontal well 
technology is a new technique. Environmentalists are quick to point out serious environmental 
hazards, which have proven worrisome. Understanding the geologic nature of shale gas source 
rock formations and the process of horizontal hydraulic fracturing will allow quantifications on 
environmental costs.  
 Formations containing reserves of shale gas have been loosely called shale rock, though 
many observe the formation as a mixture of organic, low-permeability rock material. Shale gas 
that results from the formation is typically dry, although some do produce gas and water 
mixtures that need to be separated. The rock is typically comprised of consolidated clay-sized 
particles that were deposited as muds in low-energy depositional environments and are deposited 
with rich organic matter, such as algae, plant and animal derived organic debris (Arthur 2008). 
Clay sediments accumulate and compact as mud layers gradually become pressurized to form 
shale rock.  
The process of hydraulic fracturing creates permeability within the formation. The 
fracturing can facilitate the flow of fluids through the source rock to extract natural gas. The 
process involves first drilling vertically between 5000 and 12000 ft., and then drilling for a few 
thousand feet (Rahm 2011). Steel casings are cemented into place to protect freshwater aquifers 
that typically lie above the shale rock. High pressure pumping of the liquid mixture causes 
fractures and cracks, to which clay and sand particulates act as “propping” agents, flowing in and 
holding the fractures open. Once pumping of the fluids stops, the gas flows back through the 
horizontal portion and then through the vertical portion of the well (Arthur 2008).  
In a study of 68 private drinking water wells in northern Pennsylvania and New York, 
high amounts of methane were claimed to be found within fracking sites (Holzman 2011). The 
amounts of water needed for shale gas plays is immense and is estimated at up to 5 million 
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gallons per well (EPA 2010). An estimated 15%-80% of wastewater is flown back through the 
well, and proper disposal of this ‘flowback’ is crucial to mitigating effects of hydraulic fracturing 
on local lands and water supplies. Pennsylvania passed the Marcellus Shale Bill in May of 2010, 
enforcing a three year ban on hydraulic fracturing until more research has been done into shale 
wastewater mitigation, and New York has taken a similar stance. Understanding the damage to 
local water supplies and degrees of mitigation will be essential for future exploration of the 
Marcellus Shale.  
The additives to the water-sand mixture pumped into the ground makes up a majority of 
the worry associated with hydraulic fracturing, most of which are essential for successful shale 
gas plays. A Hydrochloric acid mixture is utilized at the beginning of the shale gas play to clean 
up the area. Corrosion inhibitors are also used in engineering simulations that test wells for 
productivity. Biocides are used to make sure bacterial corrosion does not happen in the wellbore, 
because fracture fluids are typically containing organic materials that provide a nice medium for 
bacteria growth. Fracking fluids are known to contain more than 99% water, however drilling 
companies are not required to disclose the other chemicals they use during the process. Other 
chemicals that have been used are said to be potassium chloride, guar gum, ethylene glycol, 
sodium carbonate, potassium carbonate, sodium chloride, borate salts, citric acid, glutaraldehyde, 
or isopropanol (Rahm 2011). Although these added chemicals are mostly noted as non-toxic by 
proponents of hydraulic fracturing (Vaugn and Pursell 2010), it is vital to mitigate the potential 
for chemicals to leak into local grounds.  
Disposal of wastewater can be done directly into land or involve deep-injection into 
surface waters, depending on the location of the wellhead (Rahm 2011). Improper mitigation has 
caused serious environmental opposition in Pennsylvania, most notably in Clearfield County, 
Dunkard Creek, Monongahala River, Hopewell Township, and Dimcock (Vaughn and Pursell 
2010). As a global leader in oil and natural gas production, it is obvious to turn to Texas to 
understand exactly how they have handled water issues surrounding hydraulic fracturing. A case 
study on shale gas production in Texas shows little environmental regulation here. 
Texas…does not have centralized administrative structure for managing 
environmental regulation. Multiple commissions and authorities have a role to 
play in jurisdiction over mineral, water, air, and land regulation. But…Texas does 
not have a strong ethos of environmental protectionism. Moreover, under the 
leadership of Governor Rick Perry, Texas has taken a decidedly anti-EPA and 
anti-federal regulation position (Rahm 2011). 
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The Texas Railroad Commission regulates the oil and gas industry and has conflicted with the 
EPA due to relaxed enforcement of the Safe Drinking Water Act. The Railroad Commission 
allows drilling companies to use as much groundwater as they want (Texas Railroad 
Commission, 2013) and the state thrives from the industry. In general, wastewater control has 
shown itself as a problem in Texas. For example, when finding flammables present in drinking 
water, the EPA declared an Imminent and Substantial Endangerment Order in December 2010 to 
protect waters in Southern Parker County, located next to Barnett shale wellheads. The federal 
government will most likely continue to clash with local authorities in Texas.   
 Costs to mitigate flowback brought by hydraulic fracturing are essential to understanding 
the possible exploration of the Marcellus Shale. The Marcellus Shale is noted as a large shale gas 
basin that has barely been explored and extracted. In the near future this will likely change, as 
the emergence of successful plays around the United States and the ever-growing demand of 
energy will put pressure on local Northeast leaders to drill. Responsible price scenarios for 
extraction and environmental mitigation of flowback wastewater will be imperative to analyzing 
whether to drill in certain Marcellus areas. 
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Chapter III. Data Description and Methodology 
 
 In this chapter, data series and methodologies are explained in detail. The data is two-fold 
with shale gas production and gas spot price data gathered. For shale production, raw datasets of 
shale production according to lease number was extracted from the Drilling Info database and 
was aggregated to form three variables for each shale play: the total gas produced in a month, the 
count of flowing wells in each month, and the average gas produced per lease number in each 
month. Meanwhile, weekly spot price data was accessed through the Intelligence Press. Through 
developing ARDL (Autoregressive Distributed Lag) Models, granger causality tests were 
analyzed between production and prices in both causality directions. 
III. 1. Data Series   
 
III. 1 Shale Gas Production 
 
 Monthly, aggregated shale gas production for seven major shale plays from the Drilling 
Info database was gathered. Each shale play has three different measures of production: the 
average gas produced by lease per month, the number of flowing wells per month, and the total 
gas produced by month. A lease refers to a number of flowing wells that a specific company may 
hold at a given time. The seven shale plays were the Barnett Shale in north-central Texas, the 
Fayetteville Shale in Arkansas, the Woodford Shale in Oklahoma, the Eagle Ford Shale in 
southern Texas, the Bakken Shale in west North Dakota and east Montana, the Haynesville Shale 
in east Texas and west Louisiana, and the Marcellus Shale in New York, Pennsylvania, West 
Virginia, and Ohio. The monthly data starts when horizontal drilling begins for that particular 
shale play, which is different for each shale play.  
 Total gas produced per month is compiled and shown in a scatter-plot (Figure 3-1). The 
Barnett Shale is denoted BAR Sum starts with exploratory wells in 1996. Consistent increases 
pick up in late 2003, where it rises consistently until mid-2008. The rate of increase slows to the 
end of the series and reaches the highest point in December of 2011, at roughly 168.5 million 
MCF. The Barnett is clearly the most developed shale reservoir in the country. Meanwhile, the 
Fayetteville is denoted FAY Sum in the key and starts production in September 2004, increasing 
consistently in January 2006 through 2012. Woodford shale plays start in 2005 and are denoted 
Wood Sum. This series increases in 2008 through 2010, where it gradually increases to a high of 
about 21.8 million MCF (almost 13 times less than the highest total in the Barnett shale). The 
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Bakken shale is barely visible when plotting with the Barnett play and is denoted BAK sum. We 
see its movement more clearly in the Appendix, as in March 2006 wellheads increase production 
fairly rapidly until late 2007, where production remains relatively steady until another increases 
in June 2011 through 2012, reaching a high of roughly 0.913 million MCF in August 2012. The 
Haynesville shale starts production in 2008, denoted HAY sum, and starts a steady increase in 
February 2009, reaching a high of 63.51 million MCF in May 2012 before starting to taper off. 
The Eagle Ford shale gets similarly dwarfed as the Bakken shale, denoted as EF Sum. This series 
can be viewed in the Appendix, and starts production in June 2008, with a steady increase 
starting in October 2009, until reaching a maximum of 13.69 million MCF in October 2011 and 
tailing off into 2012. Lastly, the Marcellus shale, denoted Mar Sum, starts production in 
November 2008 and increases exponentially through the end of the series in June 2012. Unlike 
other shale plays, the Marcellus did not taper off, as wells were simply halted in June.  
 
Figure 3-1. Total Gas per Month for all seven shale plays. Note BAR Sum = Barnett total 
production by month; FAY Sum = Fayetteville total production by month; WOOD Sum = 
Woodford total production by month; BAK Sum = Bakken total production by month; MAR Sum 
= Marcellus total production by month; HAYN Sum = Haynesville total production by month; EF 
Sum = Eagle Ford total production by month 
 
A logarithmic scatter plot of well count shows exactly when the seven shale series 
increased, and the various shale plays follow a similar profile to the total gas per month series 
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(Figure 3-2). The logarithmic scale, with a base of 20 depicts when each play started production 
and wells sprang up. Without the log scale, the Barnett series dwarfs all aggregated well counts, 
as this reservoir hits highs over 13000 flowing wells per month, while the next-highest 
Fayetteville hits highs to over 4000, and the other plays fail to get higher than 1000 flowing 
wells per month.  
Figure 3-2. Flowing Well Count per shale play. Note BAR WellCount = Barnett flowing wells 
per month; FAY WellCount = Fayetteville flowing wells per month; WOOD WellCount = 
Woodford flowing wells per month; BAK WellCount = Bakken flowing wells per month; MAR 
WellCount = Marcellus flowing wells per month; HAYN WellCount = Haynesville flowing wells 
per month; EF WellCount = Eagle Ford flowing wells per month 
  
 Average gas per lease number per month is compiled in an XY scatter plot (Figure 3-3). 
The Barnett and Fayetteville are some of the lowest because these reservoirs have high well 
counts, while the Haynesville, Marcellus, and Eagle Ford plays are some of the highest because 
they have low well counts.  Barnett averages increases in 2005-2006 and taper off through the 
series, reaching a high in July 2005 with 24.3 thousand MCF per aggregated lease. Average 
Fayetteville leases increase rapidly in 2006 and slowly decline in 2009, after a high of 26.2 
thousand MCF. Average Woodford leases are erratic, but increase to a high of roughly 57 
thousand MCF in November 2008 where it then declines through temporal spikes. Bakken 
averages are consistently low but see a one month increase to 913 thousand MCF, where a few 
leases were very successful. Marcellus averages hit the highest of any shale play, with an 
average of roughly 83439 MCF per lease in October 2010. Haynesville averages are high as 
well, hitting a high of roughly 78590 MCF per lease number in August 2011. Lastly, the Eagle 
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Ford shale averages hit highs in June 2010 and January 2011, where average lease production 
hits at least 63000 MCF.  
 
Figure 3-3. Average production per lease number per month. Note BAR Average = Barnett 
average lease production per month; FAY Average = Fayetteville average lease production per 
month; WOOD Average = Woodford average lease production per month; BAK Average = 
Bakken average lease production per month; MAR Average = Marcellus average lease production 
per month; HAYN Average = Haynesville average lease production per month; EF Average = 
Eagle Ford average lease production per month 
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III. 1. 2. Regional Gas Prices 
  
The second data series that was used is the weekly spot price data series for seven 
different spot locations from the Intelligence Press National Gas Index (NGI). All seven series 
start on July 7, 2003 and end on January 21, 2013. These seven different spots are the Henry Hub 
spot in southern Louisiana, the El Paso Permian spot in east Texas, the Rocky Mountain spot 
price, also known as Opal, in north Wyoming, the Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) city-gate in 
west California, the SoCal spot price located in southern California, the Transco Zone 6 New 
York spot price located in New York City, and the Algonquin city-gate located in Massachusetts. 
The seven spots are dispersed well enough to hit three regions in the United States, with the east 
and west coast represented, and the South, the heart of domestic natural gas production, is well 
represented with two spots, while the Opal is the lone Midwest spot.  
Seven spots and their price movements through the monthly time series is shown in a line 
graph (Figure 3-4). The Opal price series reaches lows in 2007 and falls significantly away from 
the rest of the series for about ten months before coming back. Other than this hiccup, these price 
series seem to be integrated and could be used to loosely test the Law of One Price rule. 
However, this test would be weak as there are only seven spots and the geographic market is not 
well represented throughout. 
 
Figure 3-4. Weekly Spot Location Price Series. Note: CALPGCC = California PG&E spot; 
CALSSOCAL = Southern California spot; NEAALGCG = New England Algonquin spot; 
NEATZ6NY = Transco Zone 6 New York; RMTOPAL = Rocky Mountain Opal spot;  
SLAHH = Southern Louisiana Henry Hub spot; WTXEPP = West Texas El Paso Permian spot 
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III. 2. Methodology 
 The analysis attempts to quantify the geographic downstream market for natural gas and 
the ways in which wellhead production from horizontal drilling influences prices. Cointegration 
is used to describe two or more series that have similar linear movements. Cointegration occurs 
when two or more series generates a linear combination such that there is a stationary process in 
which the said series drifts in a similar way. Furthermore, tests for causality can observe which 
series drifts first and causes the other series to move similarly. The specific degree of causality 
that a spot price would have on a shale gas production level, or that a shale gas production level 
would have on a spot price will let us analyze how different regions of supply and demand affect 
each other within a time series. The rationale could be made for both price to significantly 
influence quantity and quantity to significantly influence price. An increase in price would make 
investing in gas production more favorable, and an increase in gas production might cause prices 
to drop, although the recent economic recession could be at play as well. This level of thought is 
the basis for the test, with the goal to quantify the degree of market integration between regions 
of gas production and prices.  
 Significant causality relationships between time-series data can be analyzed through the 
use of an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model. The model runs an Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression with time lags on the variables in the estimation. Based on the Koyck 
Lag Structure to quantify geometric effects of past on current events, Figure 3-5 shows an 
example of the derivation of an ARDL model from a distributed lag model.  
 
Figure 3-5. Example of the derivation of an ARDL model 
 
For simplicity, this ARDL model only used one lag and one lag interval. The analysis 
performed in the next chapter uses 12 lags as recommended for monthly data, and anywhere 
from one to four intervals. The ARDL model in Figure 3-5  is run with the dependent variable 
(1) BAR_AVERAGEt = c + 0CALPGCCt + 0CALPGCCt-1 + 1CALSSOCALt + 1CALSSOCALt-1 + ut 
(2) BAR_AVERAGEt-1 = c + 0CALPGCCt-1 + 0 
2
CALPGCCt-2 + 1CALSSOCALt-1 + 1
2
CALSSOCALt-2 
(3) BAR_AVERAGEt-1 = c + 0
2
CALPGCCt-1 + 0 
3
CALPGCCt-2 + 1
2
CALSSOCALt-1 + 
1
3
CALSSOCALt-2 
 
(4) BAR_AVERAGEt - BAR_AVERAGEt-1 = c(1-) + 0CALPGCCt + CALSSOCALt + (ut - ut-1) 
(5) BAR_AVERAGEt = c(1-) + BAR_AVERAGEt-1 + 0CALPGCCt + CALSSOCALt + (ut - ut-1) 
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BAR_AVERAGEt, the average Barnett shale gas production per lease number series, and 
independent variables CALPGCCt, the California PG&C price series, and CALSSOCALt, the 
California SoCal price series, with 0 and 1 as coefficients, c as a constant, and  as the 
geometric rate of decline. The steps taken to generate equation (5) was to start with equation (1) 
as a distributed lag model with rate of decline  substituted in, to then lag the model by one 
period to get equation (2), to multiply both sides of equation (2) by rate of decline , and then 
subtracting equation (3) from (1) to get the ARDL model (4). Equation (5) is equal to equation 
(4) but is rewritten to have dependent variable BAR_AVERAGEt alone on the right-side. The 
analysis uses up to four lag intervals, and the number of intervals was selected with the use of 
optimal lag-length criteria, selected with a combination of the Hannon-Quinn, Akaike 
Information Criterion, and Schwartz criterion methods, which take collinearity and other 
statistical problems with estimators into account when choosing the optimal lag structure for a 
given ARDL model specification (Hacker and Hatemi-J 2008; Lütkepohl 1985). 
 Through the constructing of many different ARDL models, similar to the one shown in 
equation (5), the analysis matched a shale production series with all price series to test for 
causation. Granger causality tests are cointegration tests that prove significant causality within a 
geographic market. These tests analyze whether a variable X can cause another variable Y when 
forecasting of current value of Y can be improved by using information on past values of X. 
Granger causality tests involves using lagged values of X to explain movement in the current 
value of Y, and when Yt can be predicted better by using past values of X, there is Granger 
causality. Furthermore, when bidirectional Granger causality exists there is said to be feedback 
between the two variables (Doane and Spulber 1994; Granger 1969).  
Testing for Granger causality with shale gas production data requires two adjustments to 
the price series. The first adjustment is required because the natural gas production data series 
was monthly while the spot price series was weekly. Statistical analyses for causality cannot be 
done if all variables do not have the same period. The spot price series was converted from 
weekly to monthly to match the time series of the production data. This conversion involved 
taking the average of three or four weekly data points in one given month and using this average 
as a monthly series. The second adjustment was made because the price data was dependent on 
the season, as prices consistently peaked in the winter and dipped during the summer. 
Meanwhile, the production data is not seasonal, and thus taking away this effect was necessary to 
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match the two databases. The seasonal adjustment used is known as the X-11-ARIMA seasonal 
adjustment method. This method is known to reduce about 30% in the bias of 20% in the 
absolute value of the total error in the seasonal factor forecasts for the 12 months, and when 
corresponding to peaks and troughs this reduction is larger (Dagum 2005).  
Residual tests for ARDL estimators were performed to check if the estimators 
represented were the best linear, unbiased estimators. The Portmanteau and Lagrange Multiplier 
tests were used to check for autocorrelations, with the desire to accept null hypothesis that the 
estimator residuals had no serial correlation up to lag k. Autocorrelations result in the estimated 
coefficients not having the minimum variance among all estimates and are inefficient. 
Significance in these tests suggests that the error terms, also known as residuals, are closely 
related (Hosking 1980; Peña and Rodríguez 2002). Meanwhile, the White test was used to test 
for heteroskedasticity, which tests for patterns and whether or not degrees of finite variance exist 
or the estimators are completely random (White 1980). Lastly, Jarque-Bera normality tests were 
used, testing kurtosis and skewness to check whether data matches that of a normal distribution 
(Thadewad and Büning 2004).  
 
III. 3. Hypotheses  
 The hypotheses prior to the analysis were based on two key factors. Firstly, the natural 
gas pipeline network infrastructure relative to shale play and spot price locations was taken into 
account. Recall Figure 1-3, which showed the national gas pipeline layout. Observations 
pertaining to this map will lend an idea as to how wellheads from certain regions can affect the 
spot price in another region. A specific shale play should require more lag intervals to affect a 
price series geographically farther away  as opposed to one that is geographically closer. 
Secondly, a specific shale play’s amount of gas and length of production time will likely have an 
impact on how significant it reacts with regional price series.  
 The Barnett Shale has been a leading gas source for America in recent years and this fact 
alone should allow Barnett production to cause feedback (granger causality both ways) with 
most spot prices. El Paso Permian and the Henry Hub spot prices are particularly good bets for 
causality because of their close proximity to the Barnett shale. The pipelines to the California 
spots-PG&C and SoCal-to Texas seem direct and cointegration could come here as well. 
Production from the Woodford shale in Oklahoma is also extensive and causality could be seen 
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for most spot prices. The El Paso Permian spot is very close is the best bet for feedback, while 
pipelines out of Oklahoma seem relatively direct to the Northeast and the West so cointegration 
could be expected here. The Henry Hub and Opal spots do not seem directly connected through 
pipelines with the Woodford and causality is not expected here. The Haynesville shale has been 
developed considerably in the past few years and feedback could be expected with multiple 
spots. The Henry Hub is the best bet for causality based upon close location to these shale plays, 
however the Northeast spots and the Opal could see integration with relatively direct lines to 
these regions.  
 The Fayetteville shale has been developed considerably, and the Henry Hub is the closest 
and should have causality. The northeast spots are also good candidates, as the piping from 
Arkansas to New York seems adequate. Bakken shale production has not reached high levels, 
and thus the expectation is that no causality will occur with spot prices. The Opal price series is 
the closest to these shale plays and has the best chance at causality, but just based off sheer lack 
of production, this is unlikely. The Eagle Ford shale production in south Texas has been steady 
in recent years and could interact with the El Paso Permian and Henry Hub spots, which are both 
close to these wellheads. Piping infrastructure shows itself relatively direct from south Texas to 
the Northeast and West, and given more lag intervals, significant causality could show here as 
well. The Opal spot seems a bit too far to feel an effect from the Eagle Ford. The Marcellus 
production was relatively extensive for a year and a half, and despite a short time series it should 
exhibit causality with the two Northeast spots with one or two lag intervals. As stated previously, 
spot prices tend to move in a similar fashion with the exception of the Opal spot price which 
drifts lower than other price series in 2007. Through observing significant causality relationships 
with different shale plays, we may be able to discuss how supply altered this price series with 
respect to the others.  
 The question of which type of aggregated shale data series will Granger cause prices and 
which types will be Granger caused by prices is interesting to note. The count of flowing wells 
and total production in a given month should be Granger caused by prices more often. Prices 
dictate whether or not it is feasible to invest and build more wells and get subsequent more 
production. These two data series matched the movements of one another and it would be 
expected for them to test significant and insignificant in a somewhat similar fashion. Meanwhile, 
the average natural gas per lease number is a bit more complex category and may granger cause 
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prices. This variable depicts good and bad performance of natural gas wellheads in a particular 
month, which could bleed through the gas market with more efficiency than the other two 
production variables.  
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Chapter IV. Results and Discussion 
 
ARDL models are generated for a specific shale play series variable (i.e. Woodford 
Average), and different spot price series. Results showed a large degree of causality with both 
shale production to spot prices and spot prices to shale production, although the former 
relationship was found significant more often than the latter. Two-way granger causality, known 
as feedback, was found for sixteen different relationships. With regards to the hypothesis, some 
significance hit where it was expected while other times significance hit where it wasn’t 
expected.  
 
IV. 1. Results  
 
 Granger tests for causality were run from various ARDL models, and significant 
relationships are summarized in Table 1. Note that the table has two variables in every row, the 
first being the dependent variable and the second being a variable that was said to Granger cause 
the dependent variable given a certain number of lags and intervals. In total, there were 100 
significant Granger causalities among 278 different combinations of Granger directions between 
a given spot price series and a given shale production series, a 36% chance of significance. 
 
Table 4-1. Summary of granger causality tests with 12 lags chosen. Note the direction of granger 
causality “Dependent variable is GRANGER CAUSED by other variable.” Number of lag 
intervals and P-values showing significance listed. 
Dependent Variable Granger Causing 
Variable 
Number of Lag 
Intervals 
P-Value 
Wyoming Opal Haynesville Average 4 0.0000*** 
Eagle Ford Sum Transco Zone 6 NY 3 0.0000*** 
Eagle Ford Sum Algonquin Citygate MA 3 0.0001*** 
PG&C CA Haynesville Average 3 0.0002*** 
Transco Zone 6 NY Haynesville Average 4 0.0006*** 
SoCal CA Haynesville Average 3 0.0012*** 
Transco Zone 6 NY Marcellus Average 1 0.0014*** 
Haynesville Average PG&C CA 3 0.0014*** 
Transco Zone 6 NY Fayetteville Well Count 1 0.0018*** 
Haynesville Average SoCal CA 3 0.0019*** 
Transco Zone 6 NY Fayetteville Sum 1 0.0020*** 
SoCal CA Woodford Average 1 0.0021*** 
Transco Zone 6 NY Eagle Ford Well Count 4 0.0023*** 
Algonquin Citygate MA Haynesville Average 4 0.0036*** 
PG&C CA Woodford Well Count 1 0.0036*** 
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Dependent Variable Granger Causing 
Variable 
Number of Lag 
Intervals 
P-Value 
West Texas El Paso 
Permian 
Fayetteville Well Count 1 0.0042*** 
West Texas El Paso 
Permian 
Woodford Well Count 1 0.0043*** 
PG&C CA Woodford Sum 1 0.0045*** 
Fayetteville Average PG&C CA 3 0.0049*** 
Wyoming Opal Barnett Well Count 4 0.0057*** 
Algonquin Citygate MA Marcellus Average 1 0.0063*** 
Woodford Average SoCal CA 1 0.0070*** 
Barnett Average West Texas El Paso 
Permian 
3 0.0072*** 
Barnett Average Southern Louisiana 
Henry Hub 
3 0.0075*** 
Southern Louisiana Henry 
Hub 
Woodford Well Count 1 0.0080*** 
West Texas El Paso 
Permian 
Fayetteville Sum 1 0.0087*** 
SoCal CA Woodford Sum 1 0.0087*** 
SoCal CA Woodford Well Count 1 0.0092*** 
Algonquin Citygate MA Bakken Average 2 0.0093*** 
Transco Zone 6 NY Woodford Well Count 1 0.0098*** 
Southern Louisiana Henry 
Hub 
Fayetteville Well Count 1 0.0102** 
Fayetteville Average SoCal CA 3 0.0107** 
Transco Zone 6 NY Barnett Average 1 0.0108** 
Algonquin Citygate MA Woodford Average 1 0.0112** 
Eagle Ford Well Count Transco Zone 6 NY 4 0.0130** 
Fayetteville Average Southern Louisiana 
Henry Hub 
3 0.0134** 
Algonquin Citygate MA Fayetteville Sum 1 0.0138** 
PG&C CA Woodford Average 1 0.0141** 
West Texas El Paso 
Permian 
Eagle Ford Well Count 2 0.0144** 
West Texas El Paso 
Permian 
Barnett Average 3 0.0145** 
Algonquin Citygate MA Woodford Sum 1 0.0150** 
PG&C CA Fayetteville Sum 1 0.0156** 
West Texas El Paso 
Permian 
Bakken Average 3 0.0157** 
Woodford Average PG&C CA 1 0.0158** 
Wyoming Opal Barnett Average 2 0.0170** 
Algonquin Citygate MA Woodford Well Count 1 0.0173** 
Southern Louisiana Henry 
Hub 
Fayetteville Sum 1 0.0177** 
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Dependent Variable Granger Causing 
Variable 
Number of Lag 
Intervals 
P-Value 
Transco Zone 6 NY Woodford Sum 1 0.0181** 
West Texas El Paso 
Permian 
Barnett Sum 3 0.0191** 
SoCal CA Barnett Average 1 0.0201** 
Algonquin Citygate MA Fayetteville Well Count 1 0.0212** 
Southern Louisiana Henry 
Hub 
Haynesville Well Count 1 0.0227** 
Southern Louisiana Henry 
Hub 
Barnett Average 3 0.0237** 
SoCal CA Fayetteville Sum 1 0.0238** 
PG&C CA Eagle Ford Well Count 2 0.0251** 
Eagle Ford Well Count Algonquin Citygate MA 4 0.0267** 
PG&C CA Fayetteville Well Count 1 0.0268** 
Haynesville Average Transco Zone 6 NY 4 0.0275** 
Transco Zone 6 NY Marcellus Well Count 1 0.0277** 
Southern Louisiana Henry 
Hub 
Woodford Sum 3 0.0277** 
Haynesville Average Algonquin Citygate MA 4 0.0279** 
Algonquin Citygate MA Barnett Average 1 0.0287** 
Southern Louisiana Henry 
Hub 
Eagle Ford Well Count 2 0.0293** 
Transco Zone 6 NY Bakken Average 2 0.0294** 
Transco Zone 6 NY Marcellus Sum 1 0.0323** 
SoCal CA Bakken Average 3 0.0352** 
Transco Zone 6 NY Woodford Average 1 0.0363** 
West Texas El Paso 
Permian 
Haynesville Well Count 1 0.0376** 
Fayetteville Average West Texas El Paso 
Permian 
3 0.0444** 
Haynesville Average West Texas El Paso 
Permian 
1 0.0458** 
Algonquin Citygate MA Eagle Ford Sum 3 0.0475** 
SoCal CA Fayetteville Well Count 1 0.0487** 
Haynesville Well Count Algonquin Citygate MA 1 0.0492** 
Woodford Average Wyoming Opal 4 0.0518* 
Southern Louisiana Henry 
Hub 
Bakken Average 3 0.0546* 
Marcellus Well Count PG&C CA 1 0.0562* 
Southern Louisiana Henry 
Hub 
Haynesville Well Count 2 0.0609* 
Eagle Ford Sum West Texas El Paso 
Permian 
1 0.0613* 
Haynesville Well Count Transco Zone 6 NY 1 0.0623* 
Eagle Ford Sum SoCal CA 1 0.0637* 
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Dependent Variable Granger Causing 
Variable 
Number of Lag 
Intervals 
P-Value 
Algonquin Citygate MA Barnett Well Count 2 0.0662* 
West Texas El Paso 
Permian 
Woodford Average 2 0.0674* 
Transco Zone 6 NY Haynesville Sum 1 0.0677* 
SoCal CA Eagle Ford Well Count 2 0.0678* 
Haynesville Sum Algonquin Citygate MA 1 0.0686* 
Woodford Average West Texas El Paso 
Permian 
2 0.0704* 
PG&C CA Barnett Well Count 2 0.0705* 
Eagle Ford Sum PG&C CA 1 0.0726* 
Transco Zone 6 NY Haynesville Well Count 1 0.0728* 
West Texas El Paso 
Permian 
Woodford Sum 3 0.0732* 
Haynesville Sum Transco Zone 6 NY 1 0.0754* 
Southern Louisiana Henry 
Hub 
Eagle Ford Sum 1 0.0765* 
West Texas El Paso 
Permian 
Eagle Ford Sum 1 0.0793* 
Haynesville Average Southern Louisiana 
Henry Hub 
1 0.0803* 
Woodford Well Count SoCal CA 1 0.0819* 
Wyoming Opal Fayetteville Sum 1 0.0820* 
Eagle Ford Sum Southern Louisiana 
Henry Hub 
1 0.0827* 
PG&C CA Barnett Average 1 0.0860* 
SoCal CA Barnett Sum 1 0.0949* 
Wyoming Opal Fayetteville Well Count 1 0.0951* 
Note: *=statistically significant at the 10% level **=statistically significant at the 5% level; *** = 
Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
Table 2 shows relationships where Granger causality is found significant between two 
variables in both causality directions, a phenomenon known as feedback. Note that P-values are 
shown in either direction, showing the level of significance that each causality direction held.   
  
Table 4-2. 16 significant feedback relationships, two-way granger causality between variables.  
Dependent Variable Granger Causing 
Variable 
Number of Lag 
Intervals 
P-Value 
Eagle Ford Sum Algonquin Citygate MA 3 0.0001*** 
Algonquin Citygate MA Eagle Ford Sum 3 0.0475** 
Haynesville Average Algonquin Citygate MA 4 0.0279** 
Algonquin Citygate MA Haynesville Average 4 0.0036*** 
Barnett Average Southern Louisiana 
Henry Hub 
3 0.0075*** 
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Dependent Variable Granger Causing 
Variable 
Number of Lag 
Intervals 
P-Value 
Southern Louisiana Henry 
Hub 
Barnett Average 3 0.0237** 
Barnett Average West Texas El Paso 
Permian 
3 0.0072*** 
West Texas El Paso 
Permian 
Barnett Average 3 0.0145** 
Eagle Ford Sum Algonquin Citygate MA 3 0.0001*** 
Algonquin Citygate MA Eagle Ford Sum 3 0.0475** 
Eagle Ford Sum Southern Louisiana 
Henry Hub 
1 0.0827* 
Southern Louisiana Henry 
Hub 
Eagle Ford Sum 1 0.0765* 
Eagle Ford Sum West Texas El Paso 
Permian 
1 0.0613* 
West Texas El Paso 
Permian 
Eagle Ford Sum 1 0.0793* 
Eagle Ford Well Count Transco Zone 6 NY 4 0.0130** 
Transco Zone 6 NY Eagle Ford Well Count 4 0.0023*** 
Haynesville Average Algonquin Citygate MA 4 0.0279** 
Algonquin Citygate MA Haynesville Average 4 0.0036*** 
Haynesville Average PG&C CA 3 0.0014*** 
PG&C CA Haynesville Average 3 0.0002*** 
Haynesville Average SoCal CA 3 0.0019*** 
SoCal CA Haynesville Average 3 0.0012*** 
Haynesville Well Count Transco Zone 6 NY 1 0.0623* 
Transco Zone 6 NY Haynesville Well Count 1 0.0728* 
Haynesville Sum Transco Zone 6 NY 1 0.0754* 
Transco Zone 6 NY Haynesville Sum 1 0.0677* 
West Texas El Paso 
Permian 
Woodford Average 2 0.0674* 
Woodford Average West Texas El Paso 
Permian 
2 0.0704* 
PG&C CA Woodford Average 1 0.0141** 
Woodford Average PG&C CA 1 0.0158** 
Woodford Average SoCal CA 1 0.0070*** 
SoCal CA Woodford Average 1 0.0021*** 
Woodford Well Count SoCal CA 1 0.0819* 
SoCal CA Woodford Well Count 1 0.0092*** 
 
Table 3 summarizes the different ways that the price granger caused the three types of 
shale production variables-average gas, total gas, and well count-and shale production granger 
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caused the price. Despite shale production causing price more often more, prices did granger 
cause average well performance fifteen times.  
Table 4-3. Summary table of Granger Causation Tests 
Granger Causation Significant relationship Average Significance Average Lag Intervals 
Price GRANGER 
CAUSING Total 
Production 
9 
 
0.0552* 
 
1.444444444 
 
Price GRANGER 
CAUSING Average 
Production 
15 
 
0.0274** 
 
2.6 
 
Price GRANGER 
CAUSING Well Count 
7 
 
0.0424** 
 
2.142857143 
 
Total Production 
GRANGER CAUSING 
Price 
19 
 
0.0364** 
 
1.4 
 
Average Production 
GRANGER CAUSING 
Price 
23 
 
0.0203917** 
 
2.125 
 
Well Count GRANGER 
CAUSING Price 
25 
 
0.029353846** 
 
1.5 
 
 
Two bar graphs are shown below, with Figure 4-1 representing the number of times a 
shale play variables significantly granger caused a price while Figure 4-2 shows the number of 
times a price significantly granger caused a shale play variable.  
 
Figure 4-1. Chart outlining amount in which individual aggregated shale production data granger 
caused a price series. 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
Bakken
Haynesville
Eagle Ford
Woodford
Production 'Granger Cause' Amount 
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Figure 4-2. Chart outlining amount in which regional prices were found significant in a granger 
causality relationship, with both flow directions. Note: Opal-WY: Opal Spot; HH-LA: Henry 
Hub spot; EPP-TX: El Paso Permian spot; SoCal-CA: Southern California spot; PG&C-CA: 
PG&C California spot; Transco-NY: Transco Zone 6 NY spot; Algonquin-MA: Algonquin city-
gate spot. 
 
 The Barnett average gas series Granger caused all seven spot prices at the 5-10% 
significance level. The series was significant with only one lag interval for east and west spot 
prices, two intervals with the Opal spot, and three intervals for the two south spots. Meanwhile, 
Barnett well count and total gas variables were less significant, Granger causing the Opal price 
series at 1% significance with 4 intervals, and caused the El Paso Permian series at 3% 
significance with 3 intervals., and three other causalities at 10%. The Fayetteville well count and 
total gas series data were highly significant, Granger causing NY and El Paso Permian spots at 
1% significance and the Henry Hub, Massachusetts, and both California spots at 5% significance 
and all with just one lag interval. The Fayetteville average gas series was insignificant to Granger 
cause any price series, but both California and the Henry Hub spots Granger caused this series 
with 3 lag intervals. No feedback occurred with the Fayetteville shale. The Haynesville average 
gas series Granger caused the Opal and both Northeast spots with 4 lag intervals, and the two 
California price series with 3 lag intervals, all at 1% significance. The series exhibited feedback 
with California spots and Massachusetts spot series. The Southern spot prices were Granger 
caused by the Haynesville average series with one lag interval at 5-10% significance. 
Haynesville well count Granger caused the Southern spots at 5% significance with 1 lag interval. 
Woodford production data significantly Granger caused all price series except for the Opal. The 
0 5 10 15 20
Algonquin-MA
Transco-NY
PG&C-CA
SoCal-CA
EPP-TX
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average gas series Granger caused both Northeast spots and both California spots with one lag 
interval at levels of 1-5% significance, and Granger caused the El Paso Permian spot with two 
intervals at 10% significance. The total gas and well count series Granger caused six out of seven 
spot prices, with Northeast and California spots again with one interval and at 1-5% significance, 
while the Henry Hub and El Paso Permian showed various significance. The Woodford average 
series exhibited feedback with the El Paso Permian spot at two lag intervals and the two 
California spots at one lag interval. Feedback also showed between the Woodford well count 
series and the SoCal spot price, with one lag interval.  
 The Bakken and Marcellus production series made the least significance in the analysis. 
The Bakken average shale series showed significance to Granger cause the Massachusetts and 
New York spot prices with 1% and 5% significance respectively with two lag intervals, the El 
Paso and SoCal spot prices with three lag intervals at 5% significance and the Henry Hub at 10% 
significance with three lag intervals as well. Well count and total gas variables failed to 
significantly interact with any price series. The Marcellus average shale series Granger caused 
both Northeast spot prices at 1% significance with one lag interval, while the total gas production 
and well count variables Granger caused the NY spot at 5% significance with one lag interval.  
 Of the 16 feedback relationships shown in Table 2, eight of them were based on the 
average gas production per month, five were based on the total gas production per month, and 
three were based off the well count per month. Table 3 summarizes how the three production 
variables interacted with price data, with average P-value at 5% significance for all but a price 
series granger causing total production series. The most significant relationships came from well 
count and average production Granger causing price, with total production not far behind. The 
summary here shows how causality mostly moved from production series on the price series, 
although, as described above, there were significant causality flows from prices to production as 
well. There were 31 relationships that had price granger cause production, while there were 67 
relationships that had production granger cause prices.   
 Figure 4-1 shows that the Woodford was found significant 17 times in causality flows, 
followed by the Fayetteville at 14, the Barnett at 12, the Haynesville at 10, the Eagle Ford at 8, 
the Bakken at 5, and the Marcellus at 4. This is what was expected, as the most developed, oldest 
shale plays, the Woodford, the Fayetteville, and Barnett found the significant the most times. 
There were more observations with these plays compared to other, less developed shales, and 
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thus a more detailed, less biased dataset. Meanwhile, Figure 4-2 shows the amount individual 
price series were significant in Granger tests, in either causality direction. The Transco Zone 6 
had the most significant Granger relationships, at 19, while the Algonquin city-gate, the El Paso 
Permian, the SoCal spot, the PG&C and Henry Hub were no more than 5 relationships behind. 
The Opal was far back with just 6 significant causality relationships, which was expected.  
 
IV. 2. Discussion  
 Overall, tests for Granger causality between production and price data came back as 
highly significant when taking into account relatively small sample size of spot prices. The most 
developed shale plays in the gas production series were the Barnett, Fayetteville, Woodford, and 
Haynesville shale reservoirs, and it is not a coincidence that these shales were the biggest players 
in causality analyses between shale production and prices either. With regards to the impact of 
the three different production variables-well count, total production, and average-the largest 
statistical impact was felt with the average production per lease number in a given month. The 
Haynesville  Barnett, Fayetteville and Woodford averages all were highly correlated with the 
different regional gas prices.  
 The lag structure had a great impact on the significance of different causality 
relationships. The hypothesis was made that shale plays would need more lag intervals to 
significantly cause spot prices geographically farther away. This theory held with some plays and 
didn’t for others. Average Haynesville wellhead production, in east Texas and west Louisiana, 
significantly caused West and Northeast spots with 3-4 lag intervals, and average Marcellus 
wellhead production, in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, New York, and Ohio, significantly caused 
Northeast spots with just one interval. However, the Arkansas Fayetteville well count and total 
gas variables significantly caused all price series with only one interval, disproving the theory. 
When lags and geography do not match up, pipeline infrastructure should be noted, as the 
pipelines from the Fayetteville to the Northeast and West spots seem very direct.  
 The Opal spot price was in an interesting geographic location. The price data was 
organized in a way in which there was two series from the East, two from the West, two from the 
South, and Opal was ‘on an island.’ As seen in Figure 3-4, Opal breaks away from the rest of the 
series in 2007 when prices drop to very low levels. Thus, the Opal price series was not integrated 
with the general price trend. The original hypothesis held that the Opal was the most likely to 
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hold significance with Bakken shale production, as they are close geographically. This turned out 
not to be the case, as the Bakken performed poorly in most causality tests.  The Opal did have 
1% significance as being Granger caused by the average shale production from the Haynesville 
shale, which potentially points to this region obtaining their gas from this reservoir, as 
fluctuations in aggregated well performance from the Haynesville shale lowered Opal spot 
prices.  
 The Eagle Ford shale well count and sum variables were highly significant in the analysis 
as well. These production series and the Northeast spot prices had significant feedback between 
them with 3-4 lag intervals. The relationship here is important to note, as south Texas production 
is shipped out to the Northeast and with adequate time lags this relationship came through very 
significant to affect both prices and production in these areas. Eagle Ford well count and sum 
also had feedback with Texas and Louisiana spot prices with one lag interval, which stresses the 
importance of gas production to the local regions as well. However, the average Eagle Ford 
series performed very poorly in causality tests, not showing significance with any price series. 
Looking back at the series, it shows temporal spikes and is relatively random, thus not surprising 
that it did not interact with price series data significantly. 
Most importantly, despite relatively low levels of production from the Marcellus shale, 
the reservoir did significantly impact prices in both of the Northeast spots with only one lag 
interval, while not affecting other spots significantly. This is important because the analysis 
shows how during the Marcellus shale production time, gas produced went directly to Northeast 
regional demand and had a significant impact. As the debate as to whether or not to drill for 
shale gas in the Marcellus rages on, it is important to note that during its peak production times, 
the resource had a strong impact on regional prices and demand in the Northeast.  
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Chapter V. Conclusion 
Horizontal drilling to extract natural gas from tight shale beds has spurred boomed 
wellhead natural gas production in the past fifteen years. Meanwhile, deregulation and open 
access laws of the early 1990s have paved the way for a spot market for natural gas, which is 
now predicated on regional market competition. This deregulation has opened the way for 
downstream pricing for natural gas from the wellhead. With a different lifespan and EUR than an 
average conventional gas well, shale wells have impacted the regional market in different ways.  
Using ARDL models and testing production from horizontal drilling against different 
regional prices, we can assess cointegration within the market through Granger causality tests, 
which depict how knowledge of past variable values can predict future values of another 
variable. This technique has been noted in many different studies to test for spot market price 
integration (Cuddington and Wang 2006; Doane and Spulber 1994), but has seldom been used to 
test between natural gas production and price to observe integration.  
Granger tests came back significant in levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% for anywhere from one 
to four lag intervals (12-lag scale). There were different insights made from the analysis. First, 
there was a highly significant effect of the average gas production, per lease number in a given 
month from the most developed shale plays in the analysis, the Haynesville, Fayetteville, 
Woodford, and Barnett, and it is known that these shale plays have had an important effect in 
most regions of the natural gas market. Well count and total production from the Eagle Ford 
shale in south Texas had significant feedback with the Northeast spot markets, which could 
speak to a significant pipeline relationship between these two areas.  
The Marcellus shale has been near the top of the agenda for most New York, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia politicians, and this study shows how production from 
the Marcellus significantly affected the local supply and demand structure in the Northeast. With 
the recent USGS survey claiming that there is over 84,000 BCF of undiscovered natural gas 
within the Marcellus, this analysis shows that if drilling were to commence, the Northeast would 
have a more reliable, local source of natural gas that could ease residential demand for natural 
gas and spark industrial demand in certain parts. The recent New England gas crunch is 
important to note, as the demand for gas in this region has increased to the point where it is 
considerably above the supply that the Northeast piping infrastructure can handle. Marcellus 
shale production would give the Northeast a steady supply of gas, independent of the long-
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distance piping layout from the Gulf of Mexico, Texas, or the Midwest. The environmental 
concerns with regards to the water supply must be mitigated and handled appropriately, and if 
this is feasible then the economic benefit of investing in Marcellus unconventional wellheads 
would be beneficial for the local and national economy.     
Research limitations were centered on the lack of spot prices. When asking whether or 
not spot prices were affected more by shale plays closer to them, the answer was not always 
clear. Regions such as southern Louisiana and west Texas, the locations of the Henry Hub and 
the El Paso Permian spots respectively, have a multitude of gas sources at their disposal. 
Meanwhile, California and Opal spot locations had little shale resources. These differences made 
the geographic market for supply and demand difficult to quantify in certain areas. More spot 
prices and areas of production would have benefited the study.  
Suggestions for further research are quantifying environmental costs of hydraulic 
fracturing in the Northeast, which would give tools to devise a cost-benefit analysis for hydraulic 
fracturing in this area, as this study made insight into the economic effects of Northeast shale gas 
drilling . Proper research must be performed to discuss all factors of hydraulic fracturing before 
tapping into this vast resource. Research could also focus on how conventional gas wellheads, as 
opposed to unconventional wellheads, move through the natural gas industry and affect regional 
prices. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
 
Works Cited 
Arthur, J., B. Bohm, B. J. Coughlin, M. Layne, and D. Cornue. 2008. "Evaluating the 
Environmental Implications of Hydraulic Fracturing in Shale Gas Reservoirs.” ALL 
Consulting. 
Baihly, J. et al. 2011. “Study Assesses Shale Decline Rates.” The American Oil & Gas Reporter. 
Beierlein, J. G., J. W. Dunn, and J. C. McConnon. 1981. "The Demand for Electricity and 
Natural Gas in the Northeastern United States." The Review of Economics and Statistics 63 
(3): 403-408.  
Berman, A. 2012. "After the Gold Rush: A Perspective on Future US Natural Gas Supply and 
Price."  
Bohi, D. R. 1981. "Analyzing Demand Behavior: A Study of Energy Elasticities."  
Breyer, Stephen and MacAvoy, Paul W. 1973. “The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regulation of 
Natural Gas Producers. Harvard Law Review. 86 (6) pp. 941-987 
Brown, S. P. A. and M. K. Yucel. 2008. "What Drives Natural Gas Prices?" Energy Journal 29 
(2): 45.  
Cuddington, John T. and Wang, Zhongmin. 2006. “Assessing the degree of spot market 
integration for U.S. natural gas: evidence from daily price data.”  
Dagum, Estela B. (1978). Modeling, forecasting and seasonally adjusting economic time series 
with the X-11 ARIMA method. The Statistician, 203-216. 
De Vany, A. and W. D. Walls. 1993. "Pipeline Access and Market Integration in the Natural Gas 
Industry: Evidence from Cointegration Tests." The Energy Journal: 1-19.  
Doane, Michael J. and Spulber, Daniel F. 1994. “Open Access and the Evolution of the U.S. 
Spot Market for Natural Gas.” Journal of Law and Economics. 37 (2) pp. 477-517 
Energy Information Administration, 2011. “Annual Energy Review.” Independent Statistics and 
Analysis. Washington D.C., USA p. 177 
Energy Information Administration, 2012. “Fuel Competition in Power Generation and 
Elasticities of Substitution.” Independent Statistics and Analysis. Washington D.C., USA. 
Energy Information Administration 2013. Date Accessed 03-01-2013. “Electricity Net 
Generation: Electric Power Sector, 1949-2011.” Web. < 
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/xls/stb0802a.xls> 
 
41 
 
 
 
Energy Information Administration 2013a. Date Accessed: 31 Jan. 2013 “U.S. Natural Gas 
Prices.” Web. < http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_pri_sum_dcu_nus_a.htm> 
 
Energy Information Administration 2013b. Date Accessed: 7 Jan. 2013 “U.S. Natural Gas Gross 
Withdrawals and Production.” Web. 
<http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_dcu_nus_m.htm>. 
Energy Information Administration 2013c. Date Accessed: 4 Jan. 2013 “Review of Emerging 
Resources: U.S. Shale Gas and Shale Gas Plays.” Web. < 
http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/usshalegas/> 
Energy Information Administration 2013d. Date Accessed: 4 Jan 2013 “U.S. Natural Gas Supply 
Basins Relative to Major Natural Gas Pipeline Transportation Corridors, 2008.” Web. < 
http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ngpipeline/Transportation
Corridors.html> 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2010. “Scoping Materials for Initial Design of EPA Research 
Study on Potential Relationships between Hydraulic Fracturing and Drinking Water 
Resources.” Office of Research and Development.  
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). 1992. “Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines 
After Partial Wellhead Decontrol (Docket No. RM87-34-065)” Order No. 636, Final Rule.  
Granger, Clive WJ. 1969. “Investigating causal relations by econometric models and cross-
spectral methods. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society. pp. 424-438 
Gray, W., T. Hoefer, A. Chiappe, and V. Koosh. 2007. "A Probabilistic Approach to Shale Gas 
Economics." 
Holzman, David C. 2011. “Methane Found in Well Water near Fracking Sites.” Environmental 
Health Perspectives. 119 (7) 
Hosking, J. R. M. 1980. “Lagrange-multiplier Tests of Time-series Models.” Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society, Series B (Methodological) 42 (2): 170-181 
Liu, B. C. 1983. "Natural Gas Price Elasticities: Variations by Region and by Sector in the 
USA." Energy Economics 5 (3): 195-201.  
MacAvoy, Paul W. 2000. The Natural Gas Market :Sixty Years of Regulation and Deregulation. 
New Haven Conn.: Yale University Press.  
Mohammadi, H. 2011. "Market Integration and Price Transmission in the US Natural Gas 
Market: From the Wellhead to End use Markets." Energy Economics 33 (2): 227-235.  
42 
 
 
 
Payen, J. E., D. Loomis, and R. Wilson. 2011. "Residential Natural Gas Demand in Illinois: 
Evidence from the ARDL Bounds Testing Approach." Journal of Regional Analysis and 
Policy 41 (1).  
Peña, D. and Rodríguez, J. 2002. “A Powerful Portmanteau Test of Lack of Fit for Time Series.” 
Journal of the American Statistical Association. 97 (458): 601-610 
Pickering, G. and Smead, R. 2008. “North American Natural Gas Supply Assessment: Executive 
Summary and Update.” Navigant Consulting INC.  
Pierce Jr., Richard J. 1982. “Natural Gas Regulation, Deregulation, and Contracts.” Virginia Law 
Review. 68 (1) pp. 63-115 
Rahm, Dianne. 2011. “Regulating hydraulic fracturing in shale gas plays: The case of Texas.” 
Energy Policy. 39 (5) pp. 2974-2981 
Texas Railroad Commission, 2011. “Water Use in Association with Oil and Gas Activities 
Regulated by the Railroad Commission of Texas.” Austin, Texas. Available online at 
<http://www.rcc.state.tx.us/barnettshale/wateruse.php> 
Thadewad, Thorsten and Büning, Herbert, 2004. “Jacque-Bera Test and its Competitors for 
Testing Normality-A Power Comparison.” Institute for Statistics and Econometrics. Berlin, 
Germany.  
Ramberg, D. and J. Parsons. 2010. "The Weak Tie between Natural Gas and Oil Prices." Center 
for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR) no: 10-017.  
Serletis, Apostolos et al. 2010. “Interfuel substitution in the United States.” Energy Economics. 
32; 737-745 
Stern, D.I. 2009. “Interfuel Substitution: A Meta-Analysis.” Munich Personal RePEc Archive. 
MPRA Paper No. 15792. 
Stevens, P. 2010. "The ‘Shale Gas Revolution’: Hype and Reality." Chatham House, Royal 
Institute of International Affairs. London, UK.   
USGS Marcellus Shale Assessment Team. 2011a. "Information Relevant to the U.S. Geological 
Survey Assessment of the Middle Devonian Shale of the Appalachian Basin Province." U.S. 
Geological Survey Open-File Report 1298: 22 p.  
USGS 2011b. “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Devonian Marcellus 
Shale of the Appalachian Basin Province.” 
Vaughn, Ann D., Pursell, David 2010. “Frac Attack: Risks, Hype, and Financial Reality of 
Hydraulic Fracturing in the Shale Plays.” Special Report Jointly Presented by the Reservoir 
Research Partners and Tudor, Pickering, Holt and Co.  
43 
 
 
 
Weijermars, R. 2011. "Weighted Average Cost of Retail Gas (WACORG) Highlights Pricing 
Effects in the US Gas Value Chain: Do we Need Wellhead Price-Floor Regulation to Bail 
Out the Unconventional Gas Industry?" Energy Policy 39 (10): 6291-6300.  
White, Halbert. 1980. “A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a 
Direct Test for Heterosckedasticity.” Journal of the Econometric Study. 48 (4): 817-838 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Figure 1. Barnett shale total natural gas production per month.  
 
 
Figure 2. Barnett shale average gas per lease number per month and total flowing wells per 
month 
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Figure 3. Fayetteville shale total natural gas production per month 
 
 
Figure 4. Fayetteville average gas per lease number and well count per month  
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Figure 5. Woodford total natural gas per month  
 
 
Figure 6. Woodford shale average gas per lease number and flowing well count per month 
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Figure 7. Bakken shale total natural gas production per month 
 
 
Figure 8. Bakken shale average natural gas per lease number and well count per month 
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Figure 9. Haynesville shale total natural gas production per month 
 
 
Figure 10. Haynesville average gas production per lease number and well count per month 
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Figure 11. Eagle Ford total natural gas production per month 
 
 
Figure 12. Eagle Ford average gas production per lease number and well count per month 
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Figure 13. Marcellus total gas production per month 
 
 
Figure 14. Marcellus average gas production per lease number and well count per month 
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